Introduction
Deeply significant concerns lie behind contemporary efforts to bring human rights law and environmental law into productive and progressive alignment. The twenty first century witnesses the Earth's living systems under relentless and destructive pressure from the adverse impacts of industrial capitalist and consumer lifestyles.
Simultaneously-along with the multitudes of defenceless living species adversely affected by environmental degradation-millions of human beings are increasingly placed at profound environmental risk and forced to suffer brutally uneven impacts of economic globalization, deepening vulnerability and escalating violence. 2 The convergence-or attempted convergence-between human rights and environmental obligations faces genuinely complex challenges. First, there is the frequently discussed risk of conflicts between, on the one hand, environmental policies, rules, rights and responsibilities and, on the other hand, the human rights to development, privacy and private property. Second, there is a related perception that the methodological individualism of mainstream human rights discourse impedes the collective action necessary to rescue 'the environment' 3 from human practices that degrade its quality. Third, there are ongoing issues concerning rights. These include questions of whose rights and which rights are to take priority in a conflict of legal 219 paradigms. Such complexity extends, quite naturally, to the vexed question of whether the two institutionally separated international legal orders of human rights law and environmental law can be reconciled in a productive and progressive manner. 4 This chapter will argue that international environmental law and international human rights law-despite the existence of very real separations and tensions between them-show hopeful signs of progress in their relationship. Notwithstanding such hopeful signs, however, both human rights law and environmental law share underlying subject-object relations inimical to their stated aims. This reality, once acknowledged, might, with sufficient imagination, become the departure point for a reconfigured engagement between them and for their transformation.
This chapter will begin by tracing the historical and institutional emergence of international human rights law and international environmental law before analyzing their shared subject-object relations. The chapter will then suggest how these fields of law might be re-imagined and placed on an alternative mutual foundation. Such a foundation could move them towards a more hopeful relationship with their own stated aims and thus enable them to respond more appropriately to the human and environmental crises of the twenty-first century and beyond.
The origins of human rights in international law 220
The story of the genesis and evolution of human rights is thousands of years long.
Human rights have antecedents in religious traditions emphasizing norms of human to human ethics; in well established philosophical traditions; in early national codes of antiquity; in early international interventions concerning the protection of religious liberty and the abolition of the slave trade; and in the emergence of international humanitarian law and rules concerning the protection of citizens abroad. 5 However, despite this long antecedent story, traditional accounts of the history of international human rights law generally locate its emergence in a twentieth century post-Second World War fusion of natural law and positive law together with an unprecedented international 'consensus' 'on substantive norms with high moral voltage'. 6 It is generally agreed by historians of international human rights law that the 1945 United Nations Charter 7 brought human rights into the sphere of international law. In the process of doing so, the UN Charter achieved the simultaneous internationalization of human rights and the birth of the 'human individual' as a subject-rather than an object-of international law. 8 These developments authoritatively established the idea that ensuring respect for human rights should no longer be entrusted solely to the power of the nation state. 9 The international order of human rights created by the UN Charter was relatively limited in scope, but since then the United Nations has been instrumental in the production of an apparently ceaseless and expanding process of setting international human rights standards through an almost kaleidoscopic proliferation of instruments and treaties.
All international human rights treaties take their symbolic and juridical life from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 10 possible to discern in the English common law tradition a philosophical thread running through certain currents of legal thought concerning tort and property and a relationship between public and private law that can accurately be described, in contemporary terms, as being distinctively environmental. The relationship between human rights and environmental protection has become critically important. There has been, perhaps unsurprisingly given the growing sense of human and environmental crisis underpinning the global realities of the late 20 th and early 21 st centuries, a notable convergence of energies between human rights law and environmental law. The two fields, however, still have a somewhat binary relationship and exhibit tensions that 'cannot be wished away'. 37 The links between the two fields were first explicitly formalized in the Stockholm Declaration at the culmination of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. 38 Principle 1 of the Declaration, in particular, establishes an international normative foundation for the importance of linking human rights and environmental concerns:
'Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life,
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being'. 39 According to this formulation, a healthy environment is understood to be a precondition for the fulfillment of human rights. This is an approach, perhaps unsurprisingly, echoed by 'many human rights tribunals and experts [for whom environmental protection is] a precondition to the enjoyment of several internationally guaranteed human rights, especially the rights to life and health'. 40 The relationship between human rights and the environment in this formulation reflects an axiomatic anthropocentrism often criticized by environmental activists. Additionally, in some respects the relationship between human rights law and the environment moves in two directions: for example, various international environmental agreements conceptualize human rights as key mechanisms for achieving environmental goals 41 The human rights approach to environmental protection has taken three predominant forms: the greening of existing human rights; the pursuit of procedural guarantees through which concerned citizens can make clear their environmental concerns; and arguments centering upon the provision of substantive rights to environmental quality and this includes a 'global environmental right'. 44 Procedural guarantees aiming at participatory justice in the solving of environmental dilemmas have proved particularly powerful as mechanisms for the pursuit of environmental democracy.
Prominent examples are the participatory rights underlined by principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 45 and by the Aarhus Convention. 46 constitutional rights has likewise pointed the way to convergence between human rights and environmental concerns. 47 This is, moreover, a development decisively influenced by civil society initiatives and the energies of human rights and democratic impulses. 48 Human rights rhetoric and law have thus been highly influential in the search for environmental protection and accountability. It may be that the prime position given to human rights based justifications and normative strategies in this field reflects, among other things, the relative histories of human rights law and environmental law. Human rights law, after all, significantly predates environmental law. Shelton, for example, points out that the paucity of references to the environment in human rights instruments is 'because most human rights treaties were drafted and adopted before environmental protection became a matter of international concern.' 49 In addition, enforcement mechanisms for international human rights law are more developed than those embedded in international environmental law. Accordingly, 'the availability of individual complaints procedures has given rise to extensive jurisprudence from which the specific obligations of states to protect and preserve the environment are detailed'.
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Despite the paucity of references to environmental protection in human rights treaties, the juridical links between human rights and the environment have increasingly emerged over time in a range of normative instruments and two of the regional human rights treaties even contain specific provisions on the 'right to environment'. 51 The increasingly forceful normative energies driving such convergence are also richly evident in the 'environmental rights revolution' analysed by Boyd and by Geller. This ultimate concern is captured rather well by Gearty who reminds us that:
… just as the human rights protagonist has often given the impression that he or she does not care about the natural world, so too have some environmentalists seemed at times to despise people. There is in such activists a potential casualness about humankind which may be understandable emotionally (it is our reckless species which has brought us to the verge of collapse) but which when worked through into policies and positions will-if left unchallenged-invariably involve the poor and the vulnerable (whose personal responsibility for environmental change is nonexistent) paying a heavy price for the polluting and destructive recklessness of others. 56 Themes reflected in Gearty's comment bring to mind, again, Tarlock's argument that environmental law, unlike human rights law, fundamentally reflects environmentalism. Tarlock, as noted above, suggests that contestation within environment law has increasingly moved to the sidelines as international environmental law has matured and gained greater normative consistency. However, there is good reason to suggest that despite Tarlock's optimism, environmental law overwhelmingly still facilitates 'business as usual', 57 and that greater consistency in environmental law might be predicated on something rather less progressive than an innocent form of environmentalism. This possibility takes this analysis to a review of ambivalence and contradiction in environmental law: a challenge ultimately shared by human rights law. This challenge, in turn, indicates the depth of the need for radically new foundations for human rights law and environmental law alike.
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Human rights and environmental protection -power imbalances, deep assumptions, ambivalence and contradiction 1 Central structural challenges
In his 2013 review of environmental law and governance, Turner argues that 'the very design of the law itself is fundamentally predisposed to environmental degradation and forms part of a dysfunctional global legal architecture which cannot achieve environmental sustainability'. 58 This is a challenging proposition. Turner's conclusion might come as something of a surprise to many, including, perhaps, some environmentalists. But to anyone well versed in critical accounts of law's ideological structures, including those of international human rights law, Turner's conclusion would be unsurprising, if not entirely predictable.
Turner relates his conclusion to the historical development of 'the global legal architecture' of environmental law as part of international law. This architecture, he points out, was not ad hoc ,'but was developed through careful and deliberate design'. 59 Turner is unequivocal that the existing foundational commitments of international law make international environmental law very unlikely to succeed.
These foundations, he argues, make it extremely challenging to hold some of the most egregious offenders against environmental standards to account. In particular, the centrality of the corporate form and its interests are of decisive significance for his argument. In his words, 'even during [their] formative years, certain features were being built into [corporations'] design that would eventually have huge impacts on the environment in the modern era'. 60 Turner concludes that separate legal personality, limited liability, the separation between ownership and control of corporations, and the legal duty placed upon company directors to pursue the company's best interests as a profit-making entity are all key structural reasons that explain why environmental legal responses fail to meet important accountability targets for modes of environmental degradation. 61 Support for Turner's analysis, amongst other sources, comes from the work of Dangerman and Schellnhuber concerning the unsustainability of what they call the 'contemporary industrial metabolism'. 62 Dangerman and Schellnhuber argue that the unsustainable fossil-nuclear energy system is, in effect, locked in by structural conditions. Significantly, their extensive assessment of the various factors involved in this lock in identifies 'modern corporate law as a crucial system element that has thus far been largely ignored'. 63 They point to fundamental design features of the juridical corporate form, which are central to the structural features at the heart of Turner's analysis. These features include the intensification of shareholder control, a development that produces an asymmetry operating as a key block to feedback loops capable of liberating energy structures from fossil fuel dependency paths. It should be noted, moreover, that the structural components of the corporate form are increasingly globalized. Critiques of the modern corporate entity are now as relevant for China and Japan as they are for France and Germany, and continue to be particularly salient for the Anglo-American corporate form now so dominant in the international order. curb it, they will come to the bargaining table with the primary purpose and duty of protecting short-term share price. 66 Sinden's point highlights the radical power imbalance and market dominance structurally embedded by contemporary neoliberal globalization and ideology. These factors are associated with deepening human vulnerability 67 and with the climate crisis. 68 Business corporations have exerted and continue to exert considerable global influence, with the complex complicity of neoliberal states. This influence affects, moreover, not only states themselves but also the specialist legal architectures, including the key international institutions, set up to respond to centrally important law and governance challenges, including climate change. 69 Indeed, the global dominance exercised by the business corporation is the most widely accepted characteristic of the global age for theorists of globalization-whatever else they disagree upon. 70 The degree of systemic closure is stifling. Transnational corporations It is not unreasonable to see such current trajectories as continuances of earlier patterns notable in nineteenth century industrialization 73 and colonialism. 74 . These, and the foundations of the international legal order itself, were deeply entangled in the search by imperial colonial powers for raw materials to fuel progress 'at home'. Both international human rights law and international environmental law are core components of an international legal order built upon distinctively colonial foundations. 75 As such, they are implicated in highly problematic and questionable modes of privileging and come freighted with the self-same subject-object assumptions that drove European rationalistic expansionism and underpinned colonial orders of hierarchy: human-human and human-nature hierarchies. 76 Despite the fact that more recently, in both international human rights law and in international environmental law, changing world perspectives have emerged quite clearly in relation to ecological concerns, the underlying tensions remain relatively intractable.
These tensions directly relate to a history and a lingering contemporaneity of European epistemic mastery. Eurocentric epistemic bias still dominates, notwithstanding counter-hegemonic narratives and participatory mechanisms. 77 3 Going deeper
The subject-object relations between humans and 'their environment' assumed and enacted by colonialism and industrialization are those that Merchant famously implicates in the phrase 'death of nature.' 78 Her analysis centres upon the Cartesian rendering of 'nature' as dead res extensa-mere inert matter-and upon the Baconian inauguration of a distinctively masculinist mode of scientific dominance. This convergence produced a system of values at the top of which a prurient and masterful 'man' was dominant: the subject constructed as epistemic overlord acting on the world as 'object'. In the process an entire hierarchy of human beings considered to be less than fully rational were folded into an imposed order of masculinist European mastery. The less than fully rational included women, children, the indigenous, and the nomadic. The Eurocentric ordering of humanity was accompanied by the elevation of private property and market rationality as 'givens' of civilizational progress. These essentially hierarchizing dynamics are deeply familiar themes to anyone versed in critical accounts of international human rights law which, in line with these patterns, still produces entirely predictable marginalized subjectivities. 79 These ideological trajectories and formations have produced a situation in which international human rights law has been widely colonized by formations of global corporate capital. 80 At the same time, as noted above, the very foundations of environmental law work against its commitments from 'within. 81 It is therefore important to face the eco-destructive and inhumane implications of the historically powerful ideological imperatives that haunt the law as subterranean archetypes expressed in tropes of legal subjectivity and sovereignty. These ideological imperatives are emerging with deepening force in the era of neoliberal globalization and of an industrialization-driven Anthropocene crisis. In short, for all the tensions between them that reflect differing fundamental moral impulses and institutional distinctions, international human rights law and international environmental law share the same set of fundamental subject-object relations and the ideologies that feed off them. Both international human rights law and international environmental law exhibit ambivalence and haunting ambiguities that fracture the very hopes they each purport to offer. scales-from the global to the microscopic. These bodies are both human and nonhuman and, as Haraway puts it, the world unfolds as a 'spatial and temporal web of interspecies dependencies'. 85 There is no 'autonomous' -in the Kantian sensesubject of human rights. There are no stable subject-object categorizations: 'species of all kinds, living and not, are consequent on a subject-and object-shaping dance of encounters'. 89 The call invoked by the shift is a highly intelligent one. It invites a response to the factity of 'our' ontological coconstitution with multiple collaborators, including microscopic collaborators, in the co-production of 'the world'. What does this mean for law? 92 Pallonitty (2015) . 93 Neimanis (2014, p.14) . 94 For a theoretical foundation for a new environmental law, see PhilippopoulosMihalopoulos (2011b).
